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Abstract: Buddhism has been seen, at least since the Theravāda reform movements of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as particularly compatible with Western 
science. The recent explosion of Mindfulness therapies have strengthened this perception. 
However, the 'Buddhism' which is being brought into relation with science in the context of 
the Mindfulness movement has already undergone extensive rewriting under modernist 
influences, and many of the more critical aspects of Buddhist thought and practice are 
dismissed or ignored. The Mind and Life Institute encounters, under the patronage of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama, present a different kind of dialogue, in which a Tibetan 
Buddhism which is only beginning to undergo modernist rewriting confronts Western 
scientists and scholars on more equal terms. However, is the highly sophisticated but 
radically other world of Tantric thought really compatible with contemporary science? In 
this article I look at problem areas within the dialogue, and suggest that genuine progress is 
most likely to come if we recognise the differences between Buddhist thought and 
contemporary science, and take them as an opportunity to rethink scientific assumptions.  
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1. Introduction  
The initial context in which people in the West came to think of Buddhism as a rational philosophy 
with a high degree of compatibility with modern science was quite specific. It was an alliance between 
Buddhist reformers, based initially in Sri Lanka, and Western scholars and Buddhist sympathisers, 
from Europe and North America.  
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The Sinhalese Buddhist reformers were essentially engaged in a struggle against colonialism. An 
important part of that struggle involved establishing the right of Buddhist thought to be taken 
seriously, on a par with Western modes of thinking, and if possible as superior to them. The reformers 
aimed to reverse the routine European dismissal of Asian thought as fanciful, inconsistent, based on 
myth and story and without real intellectual substance.  
Here the encounter with Christianity, in the form of the missionary presence in Sri Lanka, was a key 
component. The Buddhist monks and scholars who argued against Christianity in a series of major 
debates, of which the most famous was that at Panadura in 1862, claimed that it was not Buddhism but 
Christianity that was fanciful, inconsistent, without real intellectual substance, and based on 
implausible myths and stories. The key speaker at Panadura was the monk-scholar Migettuwatte 
Gunananda. He and his colleagues argued that Buddhism, with its history of rigorous philosophical 
thought and its lack of an omnipotent, judgment-dispensing creator-god, had far more in common with 
science, which was emerging in the European context as a highly effective rival to Christianity, than 
with Christianity. Indeed, they suggested that Buddhism was barely a religion at all in the Western 
sense, but a scientifically-based philosophy in its own right. As for the Western scholars and 
sympathisers, many of them perhaps escapees from oppressive or conflicted Christian backgrounds, 
they were happy to collaborate in an enterprise which promised both to relativise the Church’s claims 
to authority and to provide a new, more acceptable moral basis for contemporary life [1–3]. 
All this involved a certain amount of side-stepping of problematic issues. Buddhist sūtras might be 
dismissive of the claims of a creator-god, but they had plenty of gods, spirits, and miracles, while the 
Buddha himself was clearly regarded by most Buddhists as far more than an ordinary human being. If 
part of the problem with the Christian Church was the clergy, and their claims to authority, Buddhist 
monks also constituted a clergy, with many of the same problematic features. But this all got fudged in 
various ways, and in the process (I simplify a little) a highly authoritative and dominant new version of 
Theravāda Buddhism 1 was created, to serve as a suitable dialogue-partner for a Western science which 
saw itself as empiricist and experimental, and which was only beginning to break away from the 
structures of Newtonian physics into the heady realms of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. 
This was a science confident that all the basic problems had been solved, and that what was left was to 
tidy up the details, and Theravāda Buddhism was positioned by its proponents, Asian and Western, as 
both confirmed by and confirming that confidence. 
Thus Theravāda Buddhist intellectuals, above all in Sri Lanka, came to see themselves as bearers of 
a supremely rational tradition, compatible with science in all significant respects. The more obviously 
theistic and religious aspects of Buddhism were dismissed as folk superstition, or as resulting from 
contamination by Mahāyāna traditions, which were regarded as inauthentic, since not in accord with 
the Pali Canon. The development of lay meditation movements within Burma, Thailand and elsewhere 
in the early twentieth century reinforced this view of Buddhism as scientific philosophy rather than 
religion. The Buddhism which resulted was, one could say, pre-adapted for its incorporation in secularized 
                                                 
1 “Theravāda Buddhism” is a modern label for the dominant Buddhist school within Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, 
Laos and Sri Lanka. Contemporary Theravādin scholars generally claim that their school represents early Buddhism in  
pure form, and that other versions of Buddhist teachings are less authentic, resulting from later deviations and 
corruptions [4]. 
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form into the Western therapeutic context a century later in forms such as Mindfulness-based Stress 
Reduction and Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy.  
So far so familiar, perhaps. The point I am working towards, however, is that while the ways of 
thinking that derive from this initial alliance between Buddhist and Western scholars are still very 
much with us, the dialogue between Buddhism and science in which we are now engaged is quite 
different in nature. Neither the Buddhism, nor the science, has much in common with that which 
prevailed in this first major, and undoubtedly highly productive, encounter. If our predecessors, Asian 
and Western, could claim that Buddhism was a quasi-scientific set of ideas with a high degree of 
compatibility with Western science, this view of Buddhism as intrinsically ‘scientific’ has itself 
become a major obstacle to effective dialogue. I think this is one of the reasons why, despite there 
being plenty of activity taking place at present in relation to Buddhism and Science, it is rather hard to 
work out just what is being achieved. Many of the more interesting developments do not fit well into 
the familiar Buddhism and Science narrative, in which Buddhist knowledge is confirmed by a Western 
science that itself undergoes little or no change. Thus, while Mindfulness-based therapies and images 
of meditating monks undergoing brain scans have become almost over-familiar, suggesting a 
straightforward confirmation of Buddhist practice by Western science, the more significant 
developments are arguably elsewhere, in the potential of Buddhist thought to provoke genuine 
rethinking and transformation within science itself.  
Perhaps the most widely-known and public context for contemporary debates in this area is that of 
the Mind and Life Institute dialogues presided over by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and it is on these 
dialogues that I shall principally focus. 2  These meetings between the Dalai Lama and Western 
scientists have been taking place now for around twenty-five years. The first meetings took place in 
1987, and the most recent, in October and November 2013, was the twenty-seventh, on the subject of 
‘Craving, Desire and Addiction’. Initially, the meetings were mostly at Dharamsala in India, the Dalai 
Lama’s residence in exile, but subsequent meetings have taken place at a variety of other locations in 
India and the USA. The participants have included a wide range of Western scientists, including 
physicists, psychologists, neuroscientists and biologists, as well as a number of Tibetan scholars. There 
have also been a number of additional associated conferences and other events, and a European branch 
of the Mind and Life Institute has also been created. 
The Mind and Life Institute meetings are certainly much more eirenic and collaborative events than 
the late-nineteenth-century debates in Sri Lanka. In the Mind and Life Institute meetings, there is no 
longer a need for Gunananda’s forceful claim for Buddhism to be taken seriously in the face of the 
supposedly authoritative claims of Western missionaries 3. In contrast, we see a group of Western 
scientists engaged in a respectful discussion with a Buddhist spiritual leader, in which it is presumably 
taken for granted that what he might have to say in relation to their specialist fields is worthy of serious 
consideration. Of course, there are plenty of practicing scientists around today who would still be 
                                                 
2 Information on the Mind and Life Institute can be found at their website [5].  
3 It would be interesting to know how far Gunananda was aware that the missionaries’ own knowledge claims were 
becoming increasingly open to dispute back in the West. The Panadura debate took place four years after the 
publication of the first edition of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in November 1859. 
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dismissive of such dialogues, but the apparent level of acceptance of Buddhist thought within the 
wider field of Western science, compared to even twenty or thirty years ago, is striking. 
We might, if we so chose, see the Mind and Life dialogues as a later point in an ongoing 
progression through which Westerners came to take Buddhist concepts and understandings more and 
more seriously as a system of knowledge with genuine claims to scientific value. A fairly smooth 
narrative could be constructed by which to link these two moments in time, involving as intermediary 
points perhaps the interest in Buddhism and in other Asian philosophical traditions from the 1920s 
onwards by physicists such as Wolfgang Pauli, psychoanalytic thinkers such as Carl Jung and Erich 
Fromm, and a variety of other significant figures in Western thought. The Buddhist influence on 
ecological thought in the West, through figures such as Gary Snyder and Joanna Macy, might also be 
drawn into this overall story [6].  
Whether such a picture would look as plausible in another one and a half centuries, when the 
Mindfulness4 movement and the Mind and Life Institute will be as far in the past as the Panadura 
debate is today, is another question. Perhaps, rather than congratulating ourselves on the smooth 
onward progress of the collaboration between Buddhism and science, it is worth looking at some of the 
associated blockages and problems, and attempting to evaluate the actual nature of the dialogue in its 
current forms. To begin such an examination, I return to the Dalai Lama’s Mind and Life dialogues, 
and in particular to a book published by the Dalai Lama in 2005. This book, which bore the 
provocative title The Universe in a Single Atom: the Convergence of Science and Spirituality, was a 
kind of programmatic statement for the Mind and Life project, presenting the Dalai Lama’s views on 
the relationship between Buddhist thought and Western science [7]. The 14th Mind and Life debate, in 
Dharamsala in April 2007, was specifically devoted to the discussion of the Dalai Lama’s book. 
I should emphasise here that I have great respect for the Dalai Lama as a spiritual and political 
figure who has led the Tibetan people through an extraordinary difficult period in its history. I have no 
doubt too that his interest in science is genuine. The Mind and Life dialogues have now been going on 
for some twenty-five years. However, looking at the dialogues, particularly as they were around the 
time of the Universe in a Single Atom debate, it can seem as if there is a limited potential here for 
generating a real encounter between Buddhism and contemporary science. Much of the time, 
participants appear to be talking past each other, rather than to each other, in part perhaps because of 
communication difficulties stemming from translation issues, but also I think because of a mutual 
incompatibility of assumptions in some critical areas.  
Consider a book review by Richard Davidson of the The Universe in a Single Atom, written shortly 
after its appearance in 2005 [8]. As I mentioned, the Dalai Lama’s book constitutes a kind of manifesto 
for the whole Mind and Life Institute enterprise 5. Richard Davidson is a highly-respected American 
neuroscientist who was at the time more or less in charge of the scientific side of the Mind and Life 
                                                 
4 I capitalise Mindfulness here and elsewhere to emphasise that ‘mindfulness’ in the context of the Mindfulness 
movement represents a particular understanding of the relevant Buddhist term, and a set of specific practices deriving 
from this understanding. 
5 The Dalai Lama’s many books are clearly for the most part collaborative works, and it is often difficult to work out how 
much in them represents his actual words, and how much is due to his various collaborators. The Universe in a Single 
Atom was clearly intended as an important statement, however, and I assume that the central statements in the book 
were, minimally, approved by him. 
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Institute. However, faced with the Dalai Lama’s assertion in his book of the evidence for continuity of 
consciousness between lives 6 in the form of children’s memories of past lives, Davidson clearly had 
trouble either accepting or rejecting the Dalai Lama’s position.  
The Dalai Lama had used this argument to establish that consciousness could exist separately from 
the body, and so to counter the materialist reduction that is the default assumption in much 
contemporary science:  
The view that all mental processes are necessarily physical processes is a metaphysical 
assumption, not a scientific fact. I feel that, in the spirit of scientific inquiry, it is critical 
that we allow the question to remain open, and not conflate our assumptions with empirical 
fact ([7], p. 128). 
From the point of view of the philosophy of science, the Dalai Lama’s position here sounds 
reasonable enough. The view that all mental processes are necessarily physical processes is indeed not 
a scientific fact, it is simply a widely-shared foundational assumption among many, though by not 
necessarily all, communities of modern scientists [9]. But of course this materialist reduction forms a 
central part of the worldview of many, probably most, modern scientists. This is particularly true in 
fields such as neuroscience, Davidson’s own specialty, which are heavily committed to a basically 
empiricist methodology in which experiments are held to reveal facts in a fairly straightforward way. 
Davidson seems to have been caught in a cleft stick, between his respect for the Dalai Lama, and his 
awareness that appearing to take the Dalai Lama’s suggestion seriously might cause a significant loss 
to his own scientific credibility. This is what he writes: 
Needless to say, this is an extraordinarily controversial claim and one that most modern 
psychologists and virtually all neuroscientists would reject. Nonetheless, the Dalai Lama 
provides anecdotal examples that at least at face value appear to pose difficulties for the 
standard account of the material basis of mind. However, these kinds of claims have never 
been subjected to rigorous scientific scrutiny and need to be to effectively resolve this 
challenge [8]. 
Davidson strikingly fails to explain what these ‘anecdotal examples’ are. The principal one, in the 
Dalai Lama’s words, is as follows: 
I know of a remarkable case of a young girl from Kanpur in the Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh in the early 1970s. Although initially her parents dismissed the girl’s descriptions 
of a second set of parents in a place she described specifically, the girl’s accounts were so 
concrete that they began to take her seriously. When the two whom she claimed to be her 
parents during her previous life came to see her, she told them very specific details of their 
deceased child’s life, which only a close member of the family could have known. As a 
                                                 
6 Some authors make a distinction between “rebirth”, implying the continuity of karma and/or consciousness (vijñāna) 
from one life to the next, and “reincarnation”, involving the continuity of personality and personal identity, and a reader 
of an earlier form of this paper, in which I had used the term “rebirth”, questioned which was intended here. I avoid 
using either term in this version since it is not clear to me how far the memories of previous lives referred to by the 
Dalai Lama were intended to imply a total continuity of personal identity in a strong sense. Certainly this was not the 
key issue in his argument.  
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result, when I met her, the other two parents had already fully embraced her as a member 
of their family ([7], p. 128). 
Of course the Dalai Lama himself was, in theory at least, also someone who had retained memories 
from a previous life in his childhood, although he tends to avoid or downplay this particular issue 
when it is raised. His identification as the fourteenth Dalai Lama was based in part precisely on his 
ability to identify people and objects from a previous life 7.  
In fact, Tibetans can be quite cynical about the recognition of reincarnate lamas, which have often 
been highly political decisions, in which considerations quite other than the plausibility of the child’s 
memories may enter 8. However, for those who might wish to dismiss His Holiness’s argument out of 
hand, early childhood memories of apparently previous lives are not just something that happen in a 
few exotic locations such as Tibet, or in a small number of isolated cases. There is quite a lot of 
material of this kind in the published literature by now, and some at least of it has arguably been 
subjected to a fair degree of “rigorous scientific scrutiny” [12,13]. Such evidence does not necessarily 
imply the validity of a Buddhist-type theory of rebirth, but it certainly provides support for the Dalai 
Lama’s contention that consciousness can exist separately from the body. What is striking, though, is 
how difficult it is for someone who was for many years a central scientific participant in the Mind and 
Life Institute dialogues even to consider a basic element of the Buddhist world-view, the existence of 
consciousness separately from a material basis. Davidson continues in his review: 
It should be noted, though, that certain scientific assumptions are themselves based on 
well-established principles that have been subjected to lengthy empirical validation, and 
thus it is not necessary, nor is it realistic, to test every empirical possibility. Some would 
say that the dependence of mind on brain is one such assumption that has been subjected to 
countless empirical tests, and each and every one of them has provided support for this 
general claim. At what point are global generalizations then reasonable [8]? 
The ‘Some would say’ in this passage is notable; Davidson neatly avoids either affirming or 
denying the statement that follows, but it is hard to believe that he was completely unaware of the 
existence of substantial evidence that might be held to contradict it.  
My point here is not a personal one about Davidson himself, whose personal views at the time may 
well have been more complex than he felt he could admit in the pages of PsycCRITIQUES, an official 
organ of the American Psychological Association. It is rather that this exchange points to the nature of 
boundary-maintenance within contemporary scientific disciplines, and the way in which this is 
maintained by openly or tacitly ruling certain kinds of evidence out of consideration. Scientific 
theories, however established, are not the theories that account most effectively for the available 
                                                 
7  The Tibetan understanding of yang srid, or ‘reincarnate lamas’ as they are commonly known in English, is in some 
respects distinct from that of spontaneous memories such as those of the young girl from Kanpur, since it also involves 
an ideology of the deceased lama’s deliberate return through Tantric control of consciousness during the period between 
lives ([10], pp. 281–86, 493–98). 
8  This was arguably the case for His Holiness the Dalai Lama himself, if Matthias Hermanns’ contemporary account is to 
be believed, although the ambiguities present at the time were largely written out of subsequent retellings of the  
story ([11], vol. 3, 123ff). 
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evidence, but, at best, those that account most acceptably for the evidence ruled as relevant and 
admissible within a particular discipline or subdiscipline. Their reality is as much social as intellectual. 
All this is not to deny that there is a real problem about how to make scientific sense of Buddhist 
ideas about the continuity of consciousness between successive lives. The late Francisco Varela, a 
central figure in the creation of the Mind and Life Institute dialogues, and a key participant in the 
earlier dialogues, gave his own perspective on the issue in an interview made in 2000, shortly before 
his death: 
So [the Tibetans] have this notion which people call “reincarnation”—I think that that’s a 
very bad translation [...]. To my understanding, the interesting view there is this kind of 
idea of flow of consciousness, which has moments in which it manifests as a more layered 
consciousness, including mental phenomena and cognition, and then after death it 
continues like a flow and it comes up again. But there would be, then, according to their 
observations such a thing as a form of consciousness, although not individual 
consciousness, not a “me-consciousness”, but a consciousness, in other words, an 
awareness that is aware of itself, without brain. Now that is a little hard to swallow for a 
scientist. We have had this conversation several times with His Holiness and at that point 
we both say, well, what to say? At this point, science cannot even conceive of that, cannot 
possibly deal with that idea, and in the Tibetan tradition it is inconceivable not to take into 
account their accumulated experience and observation that this is so. Including accounts, 
and witness accounts, and what not. And my position is, Suspend judgment. Don’t say it’s 
false, don’t say it’s true, don’t neglect their observations, don’t simply say, oh science is so 
stupid, you know. Let’s go gentle, let this be a question. And as oftentimes, I’ve learned in 
my life that one of the greatest difficulties is to have the patience and the forbearance to 
actually stay with the open question, and not to seek for resolution or an answer, just to 
contemplate the question and let it sit there, which is not easy, but that's the way to go 9. 
Varela’s own cross-disciplinary perspective, grounded in biology, philosophy, and evolutionary 
theory, as well as a deep personal engagement with Buddhist practice, arguably offered more scope for 
a genuine dialogue with Tibetan Buddhist thought than the reductionist versions of neuroscience 
implied by Davidson’s “Some would say…” For Varela and his associates, consciousness was 
something that emerged and took place as part of an interactive and multidimensional field, within 
which the individual brains was only one component (e.g., [16]). I shall return to the work of Varela 
and his co-workers later, since it seems to me to represent one of the most promising aspects of the 
current dialogue between Buddhism and science. 
If the question of consciousness and the brain is a particularly difficult one, it is not the only place 
where interchanges between science and Buddhism are less straightforward and transparent than they 
may seem to an outsider. One which has received a fair amount of attention already has been that of 
the so-called Mindfulness movement, arguably based, for the most part, on a secularised and simplified 
                                                 
9 This passage can be found in Franz Reichle’s film Monte Grande: Francisco Varela (T&C Film AG, 2005, released in 
the USA by First Run/Icarus Films), beginning about 61 minutes into the film [14]. The transcription is my own. A 
brief account of Varela’s personal history and his involvement with Buddhist practice is given in another Mind and 
Life-derived volume ([15], pp. 306–10). 
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version of contemporary lay Burmese vipassanā practice. Mindfulness-based therapies have been 
widely adopted in clinical psychology, psychiatry, and related fields, as well as being popularised as a 
more generalised self-help modality in the wider community. We are still in the early stages of 
evaluating where these therapies are genuinely useful. It seems likely that they are making a positive 
contribution in many areas, if only as a replacement for the widespread use of drug therapies with risky 
side-effects. Arguably, however, this use of Buddhist-derived practice as therapy, as a way of 
adjustment to life in the everyday world of saṃsāra, is in direct contradiction to the orientation of the 
Pāli Canon and of the Nikāya period of early Buddhism, from which these practices are often claimed 
to derive 10. The Buddhism of this period emphasised withdrawal from the everyday world of saṃsāra, 
not adjustment to it [17,18]. 
A similar issue arises in relation to the discussion of ‘destructive emotions,’ which has been a major 
theme in a number of Mind and Life dialogues as well as the basis of several popular books (e.g., [15]). 
“Destructive emotion” implies that there may also be positive and constructive emotions, and it is a  
generally-shared assumption of most contemporary Western societies 11  that this is the case. Yet 
“destructive emotion” corresponds to the Sanskrit kleśa, often translated as “mental obscuration”, 
“defilement” and “affliction”. While some at least of the kleśa, which constitute in Buddhist thought 
the underlying driving mechanism for the suffering of samsāra, might in a generic sense be regarded 
as “emotions”, there is no corresponding term for a “positive” or “constructive” counterpart. For the 
Buddhist tradition, all “emotion” is arguably negative 12. Here, as in the case of the Mindfulness 
movement, a focus on the negative qualities of “destructive emotions” may well make for good 
therapy in a contemporary Western sense, but it arguably does so by removing Buddhist concepts from 
a context within which they are part of a consistent and meaningful understanding of the world and 
inserting them into another and very different context.  
All this is in no way intended to invalidate the positive achievements of the Mind and Life 
Institute 13  and of the various attempts to apply Buddhist-derived tools for the improvement of 
contemporary society, but it does suggest that much of what happens in this process is less a dialogue 
                                                 
10 I use this rather clumsy circumlocution as a way to avoid the term Hīnayāna, with its pejorative implications, and 
Theravada, which is problematic and inaccurate as an exclusive label for “early Buddhism”. It should be noted that 
material from this period can be found in all Buddhist traditions, as well as in surviving manuscripts from the early period.  
11 “Contemporary Western societies” here is used as a shorthand expression for a dominant set of orientations within 
much of the contemporary world. These orientations are of course neither confined to historically “Western” (European, 
American, Pacific) contexts, nor universal within them.  
12 The terms for the positive counterparts of the three principal kleśa (greed, hatred and delusion) simply refer to the 
absence of greed, hate and delusion. There is of course at least one positive motivational state within Buddhism, 
bodhicitta, the drive to achieve Buddhahood so as to relieve the sufferings of all sentient beings, particularly celebrated 
within the later “Mahāyāna” traditions, but it hardly corresponds to the contemporary understanding of emotion.  
13 As far as the Mind and Life Institute is concerned, it should be noted that these dialogues have served a variety of other 
functions besides the interaction between Western scientists and Buddhism that form their principal public face. They, 
and particularly the books associated with the dialogues, have come to constitute a significant part of the presentation of 
Tibetan Buddhism to a new mass Western public. (Sales of some of these books are easily in the tens of thousands.) The 
Mind and Life Institute is also closely linked to another project in which the Dalai Lama has shown considerable 
interest, that of providing the new generation of Buddhist monks in the Tibetan tradition with a basic training in 
Western science. 
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between equal systems of thought than an assimilation of the more “acceptable” elements within 
Tibetan and Buddhist thought into an essentially Western context of ideas. If this is what is going on, 
are we perhaps missing an opportunity for a fuller and more genuine dialogue?  
2. Neuroscience and Contemplative Science: The Stand-Off 
We can explain the limited nature of much of the present dialogue fairly simply. On the Western 
side, while there is certainly sympathy for aspects of the Buddhist tradition, most scholars are still 
working within established paradigms that allow little or no space for central assumptions of Buddhist 
thought. On the Buddhist side, the principal participants are no longer Westernised supporters of a 
simplified, demythologised Theravāda, but proponents of the much more complex, sophisticated and, 
importantly, largely unmodernised Tibetan tradition. The proponents of the Tibetan tradition neither 
desire nor need to concede much to Western modes of thought, particularly given the high profile of 
and level of public respect for the Dalai Lama himself. The Dalai Lama is undoubtedly a complex 
person who lives many different roles (including that of the simple Buddhist monk) in the service of 
the Tibetan people and of Tibetan Buddhism. An important part of his background, however, is that he 
is someone with a thorough and extensive training in the arguments and positions of Mahāyāna 
philosophy, as presented by the Gelugpa school, of which he is the leading proponent. He is a highly 
trained debater and logician who has learned to think within the categories of a school of thought 
which arguably offers a much deeper challenge to the assumptions of Western science than the 
rationalized Theravāda of the early twentieth century. And while the Dalai Lama is certainly interested 
in Western science, he does not, as we have seen from the quote before, start from the assumption that 
science is a final source of authoritative knowledge. It is difficult to be sure from the published 
versions of the dialogues how much the Dalai Lama actually understands of Western science, but it is 
pretty clear that he sees it as far from perfect, and as in need of change and revision.  
Does he also see Buddhism in need of change and revision? The question of how much the Dalai 
Lama is a modernist, and how much a traditionalist, is quite hard to answer, beyond it being pretty 
obvious that there are both components in his make-up. In fact, the Dalai Lama has frequently 
emphasized the empirical and open nature of Buddhist thought: 
[O]ne fundamental attitude shared by Buddhism and science is the commitment to deep 
searching for reality by empirical means and to be willing to discard accepted or long-held 
positions if our search finds that the truth is different ([7], p. 25).  
He has even, famously, stated on many occasion that if science disproves Buddhist arguments, 
Buddhism will have to change. However this statement appears to refer in practice to relatively 
marginal issues. The Dalai Lama, in other words, is not interested in insisting on the literal truth of 
traditional Buddhist geography, according to which we live on the island continent of Jambudvīpa, in 
the middle of the southern ocean of a maṇḍala-shaped universe centered upon the fabulous Mount 
Meru. However, as Rob Hogendoorn has argued, when it comes to more central matters, such as the 
nature of consciousness, the situation is rather different 14. In practice, the Dalai Lama’s position in 
                                                 
14  See his article in this special issue, “Caveat Emptor: The Dalai Lama’s Proviso and the (Scientific) Burden of  
Proof” [19]. An earlier presentation of his perspective may be found at [20]. 
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relation to these issues is effectively defended from the possibility of refutation, and it is quite hard to 
imagine any situation in which he might actually concede the need for fundamental change. On the 
Western side, scholars like Davidson represent a version of Western science that, while undoubtedly 
successful within its own terms, also often seems to have little real openness to change or encounter. 
The relationship between meditation and neuroscience is a particularly significant area for these 
exchanges, both because of the currently high profile of neuroscience within Western society, and 
because this relationship raises the question of consciousness and its status in a particularly direct way. 
For neuroscience, Buddhist practices constitute a set of physical and mental processes that, 
hypothetically, bring about certain changes within the human organism, which can be detected through 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and similar techniques.  
One can certainly scan the brains of Buddhist meditators and observe that something is going on—
consider for example the images of the location of compassion in the brains of Buddhist meditators in 
a paper by Davidson’s research group [21]—but as Jay Garfield noted a couple of years ago, this in 
and of itself is not surprising, since just about everything we do, from sleeping to watching television 
to riding a bicycle, has neural activity associated with it [22]. There are also any number of serious 
questions about what these brain scans, which are typically averages of a number of individuals and 
based on minute fluctuations of blood flow which are supposed to act as a proxy for brain activity, 
really tell us (e.g., [23–25]. In reality, we are some way from tracing neural activity in an individual 
brain in any detail, despite optimistic claims by some scientists to be doing just that.  
Here again I am not intending to be dismissive of research on consciousness in neuroscience. It is 
certainly of genuine scientific interest to know how the neural activity of parts of the brain may be 
engaged by different kinds of activities. This might also have significant implications for Buddhist 
practice, for example in terms of biofeedback procedures of various kinds to aid learning meditation. It 
might also help to demonstrate the effectiveness of the various Buddhist-derived therapies, such as 
those which have developed within the Mindfulness movement. But Buddhist thought is not derivative 
from Buddhist practice or Buddhist experience in any simple way, and no amount of brain-scanning of 
meditating yogis will either prove or disprove Madhyamika philosophy.  
What the research in neuroscience carried out by scholars such as Davidson and his colleagues 
seemed to be aiming at was that science would somehow confirm what the meditators are finding, on 
the one side, and that the findings of the meditators would somehow be incorporated as a complement 
to scientific knowledge, on the other. This was the position taken by Alan Wallace, another long-term 
participant in the Mind and Life Institute dialogues. According to Wallace, there is Western science, 
which gives external knowledge, and involves observations through mechanical measuring-instruments, 
and there is Asian thought, nowadays often repackaged under the new label of ‘Contemplative 
Science,’ which gives internal knowledge, and involves observations through human measuring 
instruments in the form of highly-trained yogic practitioners (e.g., [26,27]). Thus, both Western 
scientists and yogic practitioners are, at least in some ideal sense, undertaking an objective, empiricist 
process of fact-gathering, and one can simply add together what each side is doing. Meditation can be 
seen as a kind of ‘internal empiricism’, providing an important first-person complement to the third-
person perspectives that dominate most Western scientific research, but equally objective in its 
methods and results. 
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Arguably, this distorts the reality on both sides. Most critically, as we have noticed, both Buddhists 
and neuroscientists work from an established framework of assumptions, and those assumptions are, 
on the face of it at least, mutually exclusive. In addition, arguably, the role of meditation in the 
Buddhist tradition is not to investigate one’s consciousness in an open-minded, exploratory way. It is 
to transform oneself so as to perceive the same fundamental insights that the Buddha himself and the 
great masters of the Buddhist tradition in the past were held to have seen, in the same way that the 
Buddha and his successors saw them [28]. 
It would be wrong to dismiss Wallace’s approach out of hand. Yogic experience is certainly worth 
taking seriously, and Wallace has a useful and critical awareness of the limitations of Western science. 
It is not surprising, however, that this approach is yielding considerably less than might have been 
hoped. However, if the philosophical bases of the two traditions are essentially incompatible, is there 
any way forward?  
3. Moving the Debate Forward 
The purpose of the rest of this article is to argue that there is, or could be. Here I think it is useful  
to look at some of the contributions to the debate within and outside the Mind and Life Institute that 
have received less attention in recent years than the fMRI scans of meditating yogis and similarly  
high-tech projects. 
It will also help if we start by pluralizing, and by loosening up, on both sides, Buddhist and 
scientific. On the Buddhist side, I have emphasized that one of the differences between the early 
twentieth century dialogue, which established—one might say—many of our default assumptions 
about Buddhism and science, and those at the Mind and Life Institute is that the Buddhism that is 
engaged is actually quite different. In fact, even within Tibetan Buddhism, there is a whole range of 
positions and approaches, and the Dalai Lama’s Gelugpa scholasticism is only one of these.  
In addition, as critical voices in religious studies have been pointing out for some time, terms such 
as Buddhism and Hinduism are already inherently problematic. These are Western terms, not 
indigenous terms, and they derive from a Western need to classify the rest of the world in Western 
categories, and an Asian willingness to accept the terms of that project [2]. The reduction of Buddhism 
to an empiricist project based around meditative experience has been particularly questioned; Robert 
Sharf’s contributions in this area, which radically questioned the whole role of experience and 
meditation within Buddhism, are especially pertinent [29,30].  
Sharf, in seeking to establish an important and valid point, perhaps took the argument a little too 
far. Meditation may not be anything like as central to Buddhist practice as Westerners typically 
assume, but it does take place, and it has played a significant historical role in the development of 
Buddhist philosophy and practice. It may be true that, as Andrew McGarrity has argued [28], 
experience in Buddhism is typically more concerned with validating and confirming knowledge 
established on other grounds than on constituting a source of knowledge in its own right 15. More 
                                                 
15  Wallace is aware of the problem here, but evades it. For Wallace, both science and religion began with experience, and 
are declining into fundamentalism. Wallace is certainly aware that most scientists take most of science on faith and for 
granted, and that most Buddhists do not meditate and take Buddhist doctrine equally for granted, but his imagined 
histories of science and religion postulate some earlier stage when things were different ([26], pp. 185–86). 
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exploratory and creative approaches to experience can however also be found. The ongoing 
transformations of Nyingma Buddhism in Tibet through the visionary experience of the tertön or 
treasure-finders would seem to provide at least one reasonably convincing example ([10], pp. 294–302, 
pp. 461–63; [31,32]). 
If Buddhism is not essentially a body of empirical knowledge derived from yogic insight, however, 
and if the core of the Buddhist tradition is really a different kind of enterprise altogether, then we can 
no longer assume the simple complementarity of Western Mechanistic Science and Asian 
Contemplative Science argued by Wallace and others. In any case, we have little reason to assume that 
yogic perception is the perfect inner measuring instrument that Wallace suggests; as Garfield noted in 
the article I referred to above, yogic observation appears to have missed, for example, a whole series of 
basic physiological aspects of optics [22]. 
If we turn to Western science, critical voices have also been around for a while, and the naïve 
empiricism and reductive materialism that is the default position for much modern science, including 
most neuroscience, really a hangover from the Newtonian science of the nineteenth century, has been 
contested from a variety of quarters. A whole series of significant thinkers in the philosophy of science 
(Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn), sociology of knowledge (Michael Mulkay, David Bloor), 
and more recently the emerging field of science and technology studies (Bruno Latour, Donna 
Haraway, Emily Martin) have complicated the picture in interesting and significant ways 16. These 
often quite varied thinkers and arguments do not add up to a single unified position, but they certainly 
all contribute to a picture of scientific knowledge as both various, and deeply invested with 
background assumptions of different kinds.  
As an anthropologist, the way I would put it is that Western science is a part of culture, and that 
despite the famous claims of objectivity and value-freedom made on its behalf, all modes of scientific 
enquiry are deeply shaped and formed by the personal lives of the researchers, and by their social and 
cultural contexts. This affects fundamental issues such as what questions are asked by particular  
sub-fields within science, what connections are regarded as plausible bases for scientific hypotheses, 
what methodologies are adopted to investigate them, and what data are seen as relevant or as 
irrelevant. These issues are all entangled with other more directly politically and economic questions: 
what research is funded and supported, and who gets to be in the positions where such decisions are 
made. Neither this, nor the widespread practice of deliberate fraud and of the massive skewing of 
results by selective suppression of evidence in areas such as pharmaceutical research [38,39], 
invalidates scientific knowledge, which has of course demonstrated its utility and its human value in 
many areas. The issues mentioned do however suggest considerable caution in taking any particular set 
of scientific results as final or established They also suggest that what we have in any particular 
subfield of Western science is only one of a whole series of possible alternative bodies of scientific 
knowledge, and that some of the others might be quite different, and, perhaps, equally or more valid 
and efficacious, if in different ways [32,39,40]. 
  
                                                 
16  For Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, and Mulkay, see e.g., ([33], pp. 17–22, pp. 34–35). For the other authors mentioned, see 
e.g., [34–37]. 
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4. The Problem of the Self 
All this allows us to treat both sides in the debate as more fluid and as more situated in the ongoing 
lives, and the social and cultural contexts, of the participants. What this does, I suggest, is to create an 
intermediate space in which a more realistic dialogue is possible. However that statement assumes 
something about what a ‘realistic dialogue’ might be. Personally, I would like both a more provisional, 
tentative, playful, and genuinely experimental, approach on both sides. I also feel that what we might 
call traditional Asian thought has genuine potential for critical revision and extension of Western 
science. In ‘traditional Asian thought’ I would include not only the various Buddhist traditions, but 
also the very substantial material on related ideas within the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava traditions of South 
Asia [42,43], and in the Chinese traditions of Daoist practice [44].  
One critical issue that has been ignored within much of the current scientific work on neuroscience, 
meditation, and Mindfulness might provide an important starting point for such revision and extension. 
This is the question of the self, of personal identity, and of the relationship between the individual and 
the wider universe. This is a key concern within Buddhist thought, and in somewhat different ways it 
has also been a key concern for Hindu and Daoist thinkers, who have their own ways of relativising the 
ordinary self in relation to more inclusive and interconnected conceptualisations. 
Here is where I find some basic problems with the more conventional versions of the neuroscientific 
studies of Buddhism. Neuroscience is essentially a study of brains—individual brains. Now, at some 
level, anyone who has had any serious involvement with Buddhist thought knows that there is a 
problem for Buddhism in treating individuals as isolates (much the same is true on the Hindu side, but 
my central theme here is Buddhism, so I will focus primarily on the Buddhists). Whatever 
Buddhahood might be, it evidently involves a thoroughgoing awareness of radical interdependence. 
However, as human beings who have learned to think of ourselves as individuals, and particularly as 
citizens of a Western, and increasingly global, civilization in which the autonomous individual human 
being is a basic datum of our experience, it is very difficult not to take the separateness of the 
individual for granted in all kinds of ways. I have suggested elsewhere that the same issue can easily 
surface in relation to modernist styles of meditation, and to the Mindfulness-based therapies that derive 
from them [18]. Here the ecological and ‘enactive’ approach to consciousness developed by Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch, and others arguably provides much more substantial and plausible ground for 
productive interface with Buddhism and other Asian traditions of thought than the empiricist and 
individualistic assumptions of much neuroscience and cognitive science [16]. Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch’s work, developed on the basis of Varela’s earlier work with Humberto Maturana, his mentor at 
the University of Chile, and that of other ecologically-oriented thinkers such as the late Gregory 
Bateson [45,46], and later extended by Thompson and others (e.g., [47]), sees cognition, and 
cosnciousness in general, as part of an ongoing process in which both ‘world’ and ‘mind’ are 
constituted through mutual interaction. Such an approach allows for a variety of different kinds of 
“consciousness”, which do not have to be understood simply as a by-product of neuronal activity 
within the brain. 
It is, I think, interesting and significant that the question of the situatedness of cognition and 
consciousness occurs over and over again in the critical literature within and about work in 
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neuroscience, though expressed in a variety of often quite different ways. Take the British sociologist 
of science Steven Rose, for example, in a paper called. “The Need for a Critical Neuroscience”:  
The truth is that in order to approach consciousness as a neuroscientist, one first has to strip 
the term of any of its richer meanings. It isn’t just Freudian consciousness with its 
contrasting subconscious that goes, but also Marxian class consciousness, feminist 
consciousness and race consciousness. As feminist sociologist of science Hilary Rose has 
pointed out [. . .], consciousness in this neuroscientific sense has been taken out of history 
and culture; there is no possibility of understanding the extraordinary transitions in 
consciousness that have occurred through, for instance, the emergence of the women’s 
movement in the 1970s. Instead, consciousness is simply what happens when you are 
awake, the obverse of being asleep. [. . .T]he essential human meanings embedded in our 
being conscious have somehow been lost in this reduction ([48], pp. 58–59). 
Rose proceeds to present what he calls the ‘autopoetic view,’ in which consciousness evolved as 
part of culture, driven by the social nature of human existence, and refers to the development of a 
whole new field of “social neuroscience”, stimulated by the discovery of so-called “mirror  
neurons” ([48], p. 59). “Autopoesis” here is a direct reference to Varela’s work with Maturana [45]. 
But the central issue here is the huge limitation involved in the materialist reduction.  
Notice that while Rose is not talking about karma and rebirth, he is arguing for consciousness as 
something that exists ‘outside’ the human body. It is perhaps worth noting too the linkage with 
feminist consciousness in this quote—Rose cites his wife, the feminist sociologist Hilary Rose in this 
passage. Historically, feminist thought has been at the forefront of the critique of the focus on the 
“isolated human individual”, in large part, of course, because, historically, women have suffered 
disproportionately as a result of that particular cultural emphasis. 
The medical anthropologist Emily Martin, best known for her pioneering early work in the feminist 
critique of science, makes similar points in an article entitled “Talking Back to Neuroreductionism”, 
which takes on both neuroscience and parallel developments in cognitive science [49]. Martin points 
out the rhetorical strategies used by the reductionists to marginalize alternative views, including the 
assertion that their critics are stuck in ignorant, typically female modes of thinking: 
In other words, the Churchlands [who take a reductionist position] are with the “men” over 
there in the neurophysiology lab developing dynamic, powerful, explanatory, hard, rational 
truth; Searle and Putnam [who resist reductionism] are over here with the “girls” in the 
kitchen, stuck in modes of thought that are rigid, inept, sloppy, soft, irrational and  
false ([49], p. 201). 
Ironically, as she goes on to note, “transcendental reason, the prototype of masculine, abstract 
thinking, has indeed been dislodged from its eminent position, and the body, prototype of feminine 
concrete existence, has risen to take its place. But this “body” is universal, unhistorical [and] 
unconscious of its own production” ([49], p. 202) and in fact the body-centred approach of the 
neuroscientists and cognitive scientists replicates the characteristics of the modernist scientific 
accounts that the feminist theorists and other critical scholars on science had earlier attacked. Again, a 
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key feature of Martin’s critique is the way in which history and culture have been excluded from any 
understanding of consciousness.  
For Martin, Rose, and many others, key aspects of consciousness, and so also key aspects of the self 
as we experience it, cannot be separated from their wider social, historical and ecological context. It 
may be noticed that this brings us much closer to Buddhist senses of our experience of the world as 
fundamentally constructed through mutual causation (pratītya-samutpāda, ‘dependent origination’ in 
Buddhist terminology). I am not suggesting that the Buddha, or pre-modern Tibetan thinkers for that 
matter, would necessarily have recognised the concerns with class, gender or ecology that underlie 
Rose or Martin’s critiques, but those contemporary concerns have generated an awareness of the 
situatedness of consciousness which offers much more scope for productive interaction with Buddhist 
thought than the perspective of the ‘neuroreductionists’ against whom they are arguing. 
The philosopher Bill Waldron is another participant in the Mind and Life dialogues who has taken 
up a similar position, and it is worth referring here to his “Buddhist Steps to an Ecology of Mind: 
Thinking about ‘Thoughts without a Thinker’” [50]. This article uses the principle of pratītya-samutpāda 
or dependent origination, one of the most basic and central elements of Buddhist thought, to argue for 
a position in which consciousness, and specifically our consciousness of ourselves as separate 
individuals, arises through the ongoing network of connections between human beings and the wider 
environment. Waldron’s title here is an explicit homage to Bateson, who features at length in the 
argument, as do Maturana and Varela, as well as Fritjof Capra and others. I shall not attempt to 
summarise the article, which is something of a tour de force in its systematic rewriting of basic 
Buddhist concepts in a Batesonian framework. The focus is less on culture on general than on language 
as the key place where categorisations, classifications and cultural understandings are stored: 
languages are like habitats, because they give rise to the inexhaustibly proliferating 
processes (prapañca) of classification and conceptualization (vikalpa) through which we 
habitually, nearly unavoidably and mostly unknowingly engage, construct and perpetuate 
the “world” which simultaneously sustains and ensnares us ([50], p. 48). 
For me, the emphasis on language, perhaps motivated by Waldron’s desire to keep his analytic 
framework as close as possible to the traditional Buddhist categories, goes a little too far. The general 
point though is that we are beginning to develop a range of approaches that have in common a use of 
wider contexts—culture, language, history, ecology—to map a model of consciousness that is not 
purely local and certainly not reducible to the pattern of neuronal or chemical activity within an 
individual brain. Varela himself, in a late paper written with Natalie Depraz and included in a Mind 
and Life Institute dialogue volume Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground, edited by Alan 
Wallace, argued that the upwards causation of conventional neuroscience, in which consciousness is 
seen as derivative of the body, needs to be complemented by a downwards causation from the 
emergent structures of the self, which develop within the neural system as part of the process of 
maturation of each human being [51].  
I have explored similar approaches in my own work over the years, initially when trying to 
understand deity yoga in Tibetan Tantric meditation, and more recently when looking at Tibetan 
medicine and Tibetan health practices. I will not go into detail about these analyses here, since I have 
written about them at length elsewhere, but they have focused on describing and analyzing the 
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conceptual space that emerges once we drop the rigid dichotomies between body and mind and 
between self and environment (see in particular [33]). Consider, for example, those Tibetan Tantric 
practices that involve imaginatively-created models of the wider universe, in which the practitioner 
becomes a deity, or a male-female deity couple, at the centre of a Tantric maṇḍala. This is a quite 
different kind of Buddhist practice to that which forms the basis of therapeutic techniques such as 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction, and it presents, at least on the surface, much more of a challenge 
to Western conceptions of the universe (see e.g., [18]). Opening up the space between self and 
environment, however, in the way that Varela, Thompson, Rosch and others have done, allows one to 
see such a process as a meaningful operation on the ‘ecology of mind,’ with plausible effects on the 
individuals that inhabit that ecology.  
Thus the Chimé Sogthig practices for long life and health, which I studied as part of a research 
project with Cathy Cantwell, Rob Mayer, Lopon Orgyan Tandzin, and Lama Kunsang Dorje, from 
2007 to 2010, involves the systematic internalisation of a view of the universe as a source of 
nourishment and support inhabited by benevolent Tantric deities. This process is repeated over and 
over again by practitioners undertaking the Chimé Sogthig in retreat contexts, with the aim is to build 
up a sense of oneself as the deity-couple at the centre of a maṇḍala of benevolent, life-giving spiritual 
forces. One can easily see such a process as overriding or modifying the individual’s more everyday 
view of the self as an isolated being in an environment that is a source of threat, loss and injury. The 
point is that the effects here do not have to be understood as restricted to the neural substrate of an 
isolated individual, but as rippling out through the people with whom the individual interacts, and the 
entire ecosystem within which consciousness is located [52–54]. 
My most recent exercise of this kind was a chapter in a book with Jay Johnston, Religion and the 
Subtle Body in Asia and the West [9]. What I tried to do there was to look at a component of Asian 
religious thought, both Buddhist and Hindu (there are also Chinese and Sufi parallels), which has 
historically been found most refractory to Western scientific understanding, the idea of a subtle body 
made up of cakras, channels and internal subtle flows, and to suggest that we can see it not as bad 
science but as an attempt to create a level of analysis intermediate between mind and body, appropriate 
perhaps to the emergent self in the Varela and Depraz account, or the enactive model more generally. I 
suggested that the subtle body, like the Tantric deity, is less a picture of what is than part of a process 
intended to bring about change within human consciousness 17. From that point of view, it can be seen 
as a kind of map of the brain and central nervous system (and perhaps also of the associated flows 
within the endocrine system) as seen from the inside. Its point is not so much to describe, but, like the 
maṇḍala, to aid in bringing about change ([9], pp. 262–63; see also [10], p. 237). 
5. Conclusions 
How plausible these particular conjectures might be is another question, and obviously I am only 
summarizing them very briefly in this article. What I think they point to, however, along with some of 
the other work I have been discussing, is the possibility of a level of analysis that stands in some 
                                                 
17  See also Hayes’ similar suggestion [43]. I would add to Hayes’ account that the transformation does not just take place 
within the individual, but, as suggested above, within the entire ecosystem within which consciousness is located. 
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respect outside both traditional Buddhist language, and other related Asian conceptual frameworks, on 
the one hand, and the default assumptions of scientific materialism, on the other. The aim is to define a 
space within which we can explore what these Buddhist and other Asian bodies of thought might be 
talking about so as to enrich and extend Western scientific understandings, rather than simply reducing 
them in order to fit in with what we think we already know.  
Acknowledgements 
This is a revised version of a public lecture given as Keynote Lecture for Buddhism and Science 
Workshop which took place at the University of Toronto, Scarborough, 12–14 April 2014 as part of 
UTSC’s Tung Lin Kok Yuen (東蓮覺苑) program. 
Conflicts of Interest 
The author declares no conflict of interest.  
References and Notes 
1. Gombrich, Richard, and Gananath Obeyesekere. Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri 
Lanka. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990.  
2. King, Richard. Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and the Mystic East. 
London: Routledge, 1999. 
3. Harris, Elizabeth J. Theravāda Buddhism and the British Encounter: Religious, Missionary and 
Colonial Experience in Nineteenth Century Sri Lanka. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.  
4. Skilling, Peter, Jason A. Carbine, Claudio Cicuzza, and Santi Pakdeekham, ed. How Theravāda is 
Theravāda? Exploring Buddhist Identities. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2012. 
5. Mind and Life Institute. Available online: http://www.mindandlife.org/ (accessed on 8 July 2014). 
6. Samuel, Geoffrey. “Buddhism and a Sustainable World: Some Reflections.” Sydney Ideas 
Lecture, University of Sydney, 20 September 2010. Available online: 
http://sydney.edu.au/sydney_ideas/lectures/2010/professor_geoffrey_samuel.shtml (accessed on 3 
May 2014). 
7. His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and 
Spirituality. New York: Broadway Books, 2005. 
8. Davidson, Richard. “Science and Spirituality: Probing the Convergences and the Tensions.” 
PsycCRITIQUES 51, no. 28 (2006): 1–5. A review of The Universe in a Single Atom: The 
Convergence of Science and Spirituality by Holiness Dalai Lama. Available online: 
psyphz.psych.wisc.edu/web/pubs/2006/Davidson_Universe.pdf (accessed on 11 July 2014). 
9. Samuel, Geoffrey. “Subtle-Body Processes: Towards a Non-Reductionist Understanding.” In 
Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West. Edited by Geoffrey Samuel and Jay Johnston. 
London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2013, pp. 149–67. 
10. Samuel, Geoffrey. Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1993. 
Religions 2014, 5 577 
 
11. Hermanns, Matthias. “Teil 3: Erlöser und Heilbringer der Tibeter.” In Schamanen—
Pseudoschamanen, Erlöser und Heilbringer: Eine vergleichende Studie religiöser Urphänomene. 
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1970. (In German) 
12. Stevenson, Ian. Children Who Remember Previous Lives: A Question of Reincarnation, rev. ed. 
Jefferson: McFarland, 2001. 
13. Kelly, Edward F., Emily Williams Kelly, Adam Crabtree, Alan Gauld, Michael Grosso, and 
Bruce Greyson. Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2009.  
14. Reichle, Franz. Monte Grande: Francisco Varela. T&C Film AG, released in the USA by First 
Run/Icarus Films, 2005 [Film]. 
15. Destructive Emotions and How We Can Overcome Them: A Dialogue with the Dalai Lama, 
Paperback ed. Narrated by Daniel Goleman. London: Bloomsbury, 2004. 
16. Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1991. 
17. Williams, J. Mark G., and Jon Kabat-Zinn, eds. “Special Issue on Mindfulness.” Contemporary 
Buddhism 12 (2011): pp. 1–306. 
18. Samuel, Geoffrey. “The relevance of non-self in pre-modern Asia and the contemporary 
mindfulness movement.” Transcultural Psychiatry (2014), forthcoming. 
19. Hogendoorn, Rob. “Caveat Emptor: The Dalai Lama’s Proviso and the Burden of (Scientific) 
Proof.” Religions 5 (2014): 522–59. 
20. Hogendoorn, Rob. “Probing Mind and Life.” Lecture for the Columbia Society for Comparative 
Philosophy, 28 January 2008. Available online: http://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/rob-
hogendoorn/ (accessed on 3 May 2014). 
21. Lutz, Antoine, Julie Brefczynski-Lewis, Tom Johnstone, and Richard J. Davidson. “Regulation of 
the Neural Circuitry of Emotion by Compassion Meditation: Effects of Meditative Expertise.” 
PLoS ONE 3 (2008): e1897. 
22. Garfield, Jay. “Ask Not What Buddhism Can Do for Cognitive Science: Ask What Cognitive 
Science Can Do for Buddhism.” Bulletin of Tibetology (Gangtok) 47 (2011): 15–30. 
23. Van Beek, Martijn. “Unsettling the Cerebral Subject: Mind, Life, and the Politics of Meditation.” 
Buddhism and Modernity: Global Dynamics of Transmission and Translation, Aarhus University, 
Aarhus, Denmark, 31 October–2 November 2013. 
24. Chen, Ingfei. “Hidden Depths.” New Scientist 2939 (2013): 33–37. 
25. Choudhury, Suparna, and Jan Slaby, eds. Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and 
Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.  
26. Wallace, B. Alan. The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
27. Wallace, B. Alan. Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neuroscience Converge. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
28. McGarrity, Andrew. “Buddhist Logic and Scientific Experimentation.” Paper presented at 
Buddhism and Science: An International Workshop, University of Toronto, Scarborough, Canada, 
12–14 April 2014. 
Religions 2014, 5 578 
 
29. Robert H. Sharf. “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience.” Numen 42 
(1995): 228–83.  
30. Robert H. Sharf. “Experience.” In Critical Terms in Religious Studies. Edited by Mark C. Taylor. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998, pp. 94–116. 
31. Thondup Rinpoche, Tulku. Hidden Teachings of Tibet: An Explanation of the Terma Tradition of 
the Nyingma School of Buddhism. London: Wisdom, 1986. 
32. Janet Gyatso. Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiographies of a Tibetan Visionary. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998 
33. Samuel, Geoffrey. Mind, Body and Culture: Anthropology and the Biological Interface. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
34. Bloor, David. Knowledge and Social Imagery. London and New York: Routledge, 1976. 
35. Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993. 
36. Haraway, Donna. Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: 
Feminism and Technoscience. New York and London: Routledge, 1997.  
37. Martin, Emily. The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of Reproduction. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987. 
38. Goldacre, Ben. Bad Pharma: How Drug Companies Mislead Doctors and Harm Patients. New 
York: Faber and Faber, 2013. 
39. Healy, David. Pharmageddon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. 
40. Munevar, Gonzalo. Knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981.  
41. Munevar, Gonzalo. “Towards a Future Epistemology of Science.” Explorations in Knowledge 1 
(1984): 1–17. 
42. Biernacki, Loriliai. “A Cognitive Science view of Abhinavagupta’s Understanding of 
Consciousness.” Paper presented at Buddhism and Science: An International Workshop, 
University of Toronto, Scarborough, Canada, 12–14 April 2014. 
43. Hayes, Glen. “Possible Selves, Body Schemas, and Sādhana: Using Cognitive Science and 
Neuroscience in the Study of Medieval Vaiṣṇava Sahajiyā Hindu Tantric Texts.” Paper presented 
at Buddhism and Science: An International Workshop, University of Toronto, Scarborough, 
Canada, 12–14 April 2014. 
44. Mayor, David, and Mark S. Micozzi. Energy Medicine East and West: A Natural History of Qi. 
Edinburgh, London and New York: Churchill Livingstone, 2011. 
45. Maturana, Humberto R., and Francisco J. Varela. Autopoesis and Cognition: The Realization of 
the Living. Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel, 1980. 
46. Bateson, Gregory. Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, 
Evolution and Epistemology. Frogmore: Paladin, 1973.  
47. Thompson, Evan. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, 
MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. 
48. Rose, Steven. “The Need for a Critical Neuroscience: From Neuroideology to Neurotechnology.” 
In Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience. 
Edited by Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby. Oxford: Blackwell, 2012, pp. 53–66. 
Religions 2014, 5 579 
 
49. Martin, Emily. “Talking Back to Neuroreductionism.” In Cultural Bodies: Ethnography and 
Theory. Edited by Helen Thomas and Jamilah Ahmed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 190–211. 
50. Waldron, William. “Buddhist Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Thinking about ‘Thoughts without a 
Thinker’.” Eastern Buddhist 34 (2002): pp. 1–52. 
51. Varela, Francisco J., and Natalie Depraz. “Imagining: Embodiment, Phenomenology, and 
Transformation.” In Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground. Edited by B. Alan Wallace. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 195–230. 
52. Samuel, Geoffrey. “Healing, Efficacy and the Spirits.” Journal of Ritual Studies 24 (2010): 7–20. 
53. Samuel, Geoffrey. “Amitāyus and the Development of Tantric Practices for Longevity and Health 
in Tibet.” In Transformations and Transfer of Tantra in Asia and Beyond. Edited by István Keul. 
Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2012, pp. 263–86. 
54. Samuel, Geoffrey. “Panentheism and the Longevity Practices of Tibetan Buddhism.” In 
Panentheism across the World’s Traditions. Edited by Loriliai Biernacki and Philip Clayton. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 83–99. 
© 2014 by the author; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 
